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NOTES
JUDICIAL PRESUMPTIONS RESPECTING IRREGULAR MARRIAGES--"The law
presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage; legiti-
macy, and not bastardy." I This single sentence expresses the attitude of the
courts toward marriage in general; at its door may be laid numberless incon-
sistent and confusing rulings in the law of evidence. This note is directed to the
task of assorting and reconciling, if possible, the multifarious presumptions
applied in the more usual factual situations.
An analysis of presumptions is made difficult by profound confusion in the
judicial mind respecting the number and nature of such artifices which the law
should indulge. In his haste to arrive at a result intuitively approved, a busy
judge may build his conclusion upon presumption A, when in fact presumption
B was the most prominent factor in his a priori approval of a solution for the
problem presented. No less frequent are decisions involving a conflict or con-
fusion between two or more social policies which the judiciary seeks to forward.
The result is a fusion of causal considerations so thorough that not even the
most careful analyst can appraise the weight borne by each. Presumptions in
respect to irregular marriages seem singularly unfortunate in being tightly
bound to similar fictions designed to forward other social policies approved by
the judges. Of these extraneous influences, two can be isolated: the presump-
tion that the offspring of a union is legitimate,2 and the "presumption of inno-
cence" -- spurious, but fixed firmly in judicial thought and terminology.4 Al-
though the coextensive application of these presumptions is often apparent, no
test can be suggested for separating their effects in reported cases.0 There
appears only a necessity for discounting the effect of the presumption of the
validity of a marriage when one of these other considerations is shown to have
entered : 7 the court may well have been led, through faulty analysis of its own
motives, to assert a proposition too rigid to be justified solely by the social
sanctions underlying the presumption.
Perhaps the most elementary presumption and the one most universally
recognized by the courts is the presumption that a marriage complied with all
formal requirements, where sufficient evidence has been adduced to show the
fact of a marriage ceremony. So, where the ceremony is proved to have taken
place, the authority of the celebrant will be presumed to have been sufficient. s
'Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451, 459 (1883).
2See In re Colton's Estate, 129 Iowa 542, 548, lO5 N. W. 1OO8, IOlO (i9o6); It re
Grande's Estate, 8o Misc. 54 o , 141 N. Y. Supp. 535 (1913) ; It re Estate of M'Loughlin,
L. R. I Ir. 421 (1878).
'See Case v. Case, 17 Cal. 598 (1861) ; Myatt v. Myatt, 44 Ill. 473 (1867) ; Nelson v.
Jones, 245 Mo. 579, 151 S. W. 80 (1912).
"5 WIGMORF EvIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2511.
'See, for example, the opinions in Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 8th,
19o2); State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 (1877).
'In several states, statutes now declare legitimate the issue of marriages null at law:
KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) §§ 2o98, 2099; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 5270; W. VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 4o86. No cases which would afford ground for generalization
appear to have been decided under these, or similar, provisions: it will be interesting to note
possible changes in the force assigned to presumptions in respect to those marriages in view
of the statutory provisions for legitimation.
'E. g., Adger v. Ackerman; State v. Worthingham, both supra note 5; Ladner v.
Pigford, 138 Miss. 461, 103 So. 218 (1925), (1925) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 194; Pigford v.
Ladner, 147 Miss. 822, 112 So. 785 (1928), (1928) 23 ILT L. REv. 188.
8 Schaffer v. Richardson, 125 Md. 88, 93 Atl. 391 (1915) ; In re Megginson's Estate, 21
Ore. 387, 28 Pac. 388 (i8gi) ; State v. Abbey, 29 Vt. 6o (1856).
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When the fact of compliance with some formal requirement is called into ques-
tion, it will be presumed that the requirement was met., This presumption of
validity is dictated by a social policy: the law wishes to adjudicate the rights of
the parties as if there existed between them the marriage relationship? °
Quite another problem is presented by a common law marriage. Separation
of church and state in the United States has permitted courts to recognize that
marriage as essentially a contractual relationship does not derive its legal valid-
ity from ecclesiastical sanction.11 This recognition leads to the proposition that
a valid marriage may be created through an exchange of promises by the par-
ties.'2 Unfortunately, evidentiary problems of considerable difficulty surround
the proof of a marriage contract of this nature, for there are seldom witnesses
to the ceremony, if indeed there has been one. Accordingly, it is held that co-
habitation and repute are sufficient evidence that such a contract has in fact
been made. 3
The presence of an impediment to any marriage, ceremonial or common
law, raises some of the most serious problems in this field of the law. Most com-
monly, incapacity of the parties makes dubious the existence of the marriage
which the courts seek to find. It is clear that some presumption will be indulged
respecting capacity; 14 but the difficulties which present themselves are serious,
and have produced, in some decisions, an appalling distortion of the law of
presumptions. A few observations must be prefixed to any detailed analysis of
the problems involved.
If in any one situation, a certain set of facts is held to support a presump-
tion of validity, or of capacity, the same presumption should be indulged when-
ever a similar factual basis is proved. Courts must be consistent; if they wish
to assume morality in one particular situation, they must do so in every like
'Winter v. Dibble, 251 Il. 20o, 95 N. E. io93 (I911); Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331
(1849); Sastray Velaider Aronegary v. Sembecutty Vaigalie, 6 App. Cas. 364 (1881) ; see
Adams v. Win. Cameron & Co., 161 S. W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); 5 WaGORF, EVI-
DENCE §2505; cases collected in Note (igo8) 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 98.
" See Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof
(ig2o) 68 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 307, 318; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presunp-
lions (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 9o6. It may seem germane to the present survey to inquire
why courts wish to presume certain motives and conduct, why they seek to force upon the
parties an appearance of morality. The answer may be found only by analysis of the moral
theories of the nineteenth century, when were laid the foundations of these presumptions.
But search for a connection must be speculative in the extreme-few courts detail, or
appreciate, theories of ethics which underlie their decisions. An analysis must be abandoned
as too extensive; but it may be pointed out that contemporary ethical theory rejects the
idea of making one's neighbor appear moral-moral in the nineteenth century sense. This
change of attitude toward the major premise sustaining presumptions respecting marriage
may produce, in future years, a change in the weight and force of such presumptions.
i BISHOP, MAR2IAGE AND DIVORCE (6th ed. i88i) cc. 1-5.
=Id. c. 13.
'Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 27 Sup. Ct. 563 (i907) (partition) ; Fleming v.
Fleming, 8 Blackf. 234 (Ind. 1846) (dower); Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 93 (1873)
(petition by widow) ; Inhabitants of Newburyport v. Inhabitants of Boothbay, 9 Mass. 414
(1872) (pauper settlement). The cohabitation, however, must be with matrimonial intent:
see Reppert v. Reppert, 214 Iowa 17, 241 N. W. 487 (1932) (support). It is sometimes
said that a contract may be inferred, but will not be presumed: Pettingill v. McGregor, 12
N. H. 179 (1841). Problems presented by a migratory population in the early days of this
country led to a suggestion that a ceremonial marriage might be presumed from these same
circumstances: Chambers v. Dickson, 2 S. & R. 475 (Pa. 1816). Modem records and
recognition of the common law marriage obviate any need for such a presumption, although
it might be applied in jurisdictions where common law marriages are not recognized: see
In re Shepard, [19o4] i Ch. 456. In such a jurisdiction, it has been held that no marriage
will be presumed. Thompson v. Thompson, 114 Mass. 566 (1874).
' Pittinger v. Pittinger, 28 Colo. 3o8, 64 Pac. 195 (19O1) ; Roxbury v. Bridgewater, 85
Conn. 196, 8z Atl. 193 (1912) ; Winter v. Dibble, ms.pra note 9; Maier v. Brock, 2= Mo.
74, I2O S. W. 1167 (i9O9); Wingo v. Rudder, 120 S. W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. i9og). '
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case. The second spouse should be allowed to assert his interests arising from
the marriage on the strength of that presumption; '5 the man should be allowed
to benefit by the presumption if he seeks to establish his marriage with the woman
in a suit against an interloper for criminal conversation; 1' the presumption of a
marriage valid in all particulars should bar a woman's testimony against the
man with whom her prima facie marital relations are shown." In all cases the
postulated interest of society in presuming licit relations between the parties,
and the considerations recommending presumption of validity, are the same. It
should not matter, further, whether the plaintiff in the action wishes to attack
the marriage, or benefit by it. The social sanctions for the presumption require
that it should operate whenever the necessary minimum of proof is produced:
the presumption should operate against whoever attacks or denies the validity
of the marriage.ls Finally, in this respect, there should be no difference between
common law and ceremonial marriage, supposing that there is no statutory pro-
hibition against the former class.' 9 If cohabitation and repute, matrimonially
intended, be shown, a valid contract should be presumed in all cases.2"
A presumption, then, is usually indulged that parties to a marriage were
capable of assuming that relationship; 21 the question has then arisen in many
cases: what if a previous marriage be shown? A reasonably uniform line of
reasoning has led to a widely adopted rule that all presumptions respecting
marriage shift to the second or most recent marriage shown; 22 and that the pre-
vious one is presumed to have been dissolved. 3 The reason for this shift lies
chiefly in the "presumption of innocence"--a man is presumed to have done only
legal acts. Espousing a second woman when marriage ties to a first still ex-
isted would be a criminal act; therefore the first ties are presumed to have
been dissolved."' "Public policy" is another, and more general, ground some-
times assigned. 25  It must be emphasized again, that no matter what the nature
of the action, when the fact of the second marriage is proved, presumptions
'Smith v. Fuller, io8 N. W. 765 (Iowa 19o6) ; Hull v. Rawls, 27 Miss. 471 (1854);
Busch v. Knights of Maccabees, 81 Mo. App. 562 (1899).
"There is enforced an unfortunate requirement for proof of "marriage in fact" in actions
for criminal conversation. The rule seems to have originated in a decision by Lord Mans-
field, Morris v. Miller, 4 Burr. 2057 (1767). The action is used infrequently now, but the
rule seems to continue, though wrongfully. See 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2084, 2085.
"Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84 (1869) ; cf. State v. Rocker, 13o Iowa 239, io6 N. W.
645 (19o6).
'Lampkin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., ii Colo. App. 249, 52 Pac. 1O4O (1898); Coal Run
Coal Co. v. Jones, 127 Ill. 379, 8 N. E. 865 (1889) ; Jackson v. Phalen, 237 Mo. 142, 140 S. W.
879 (19I1). But see Payne v. Payne, 142 Tenn. 320, 219 S. W. 4 (1919).
' Howard v. Kelly, III Miss. 285, 71 So. 391 (1916) ; Nelson v. Jones, saprad note 3;
In re Biersack, 96 Misc. 161, 159 N. Y. Supp. 519 (1916) ; cf. Nossaman v. Nossaman, 4 Ind.
648 (1853). Contro: Calhoun v. Dotson, 32 S. W. (2d) 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o), (i31)
9 TEX. L. REV. 612. The converse was also suggested in Note (1917) 3o HARv. L. REv. 5o0o.
. The related problem of what presumptions will be entertained in a criminal action can-
not be considered here. It is enough to say that the requirement that the prosecution prove
its case, and the reversal of the usual considerations because of the "presumption of inno-
cence" prevent application of many presumptions. Others, notably the presumption of mar-
riage from cohabitation and repute, should be indulged. See 4 WIG0mR, EVIDENCE § 2085.
1 Cases supra note 14.
'See Marsh v. Marsh, 79 Cal. App. 560, 250 Pac. 411 (1926) ; Schaffer v. Richardson,
supra note 8; Gamble v. Rucker, 124 Tenn. 415, 137 S. W. 499 (1911) ; ef. Goodwin v. Good-
win, 113 Iowa 319, 85 N. W. 31 (19Ol) ; Hallums v. Hallums, 74 S. C. 407, 54 S. E. 613
(19o6).
' In some cases, the question has been treated as one of fact; the court then entertains
no presumption: Randlett v. Rice, 141 Mass. 385, 6 N. E. 238 (1886) ; see Williams v. Will-
iams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N. W. Iio (885).
" Cases supra note 3.
See Lampkin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra note IS; Sparks v. Ross, 72 N. J. Eq. 762,
765, 65 At. 977, 978 (1907) (legitimacy involved).
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respecting its validity and dissolution of any prior ties must operate to their full
extent .2  No social policy can be permitted to weigh in one instance, or for one
particular class alone.
The announced purpose of the judiciary to presume innocence and the
validity of the second marriage has given rise to a number of subordinate pre-
sumptions. One example is found in the tendency to deal with the second
ceremony as rebutting any presumption of validity or even of contract in the
first marriage.27 This particular result may be described only as over-enthusiasm
in a worthy cause. Existence of the first marriage must be determined by evi-
dence of cohabitation and repute prior to any separation necessary to contracting
a second union, and should not be rebutted at law by subsequent separation and
remarriage to another. The separation is at most evidence which the jury may
weigh in searching for the fact of exchanged promises in the first marriage.
No real need justifies a presumption of invalidity or nonexistence of the first
marriage: presuming its dissolution meets the demands of announced judicial
policy. Further, it seems highly probable that in no case involving legitimacy
of the children of the first marriage would a court presume its invalidity. A
presumption of such invalidity, then, would hinge entirely upon the presence
or absence of issue of the union-a test which is obviously a threat to whatever
uniformity and reasonableness the present web of presumptions presents.
Legitimate expression of the desire to find in favor of marital validity is
to be found in the presumption that the absent partner of the first union had
died before the second marriage.18 It is fairly obvious that when, as in Smith
v. Fuller,'2 the spouse disappeared three years before the second union, and re-
mained unheard of for many years, a presumption of the validity ab initio of
the second marriage may be indulged. It is impossible to say what will be the
effect of close proximity of the suit to the disappearance of the first spouse:
no cases appear to have discussed it.. The function of the presumption is sim-
ply to permit the court, under the urge of social policy, to act as it would if the
missing spouse were dead, in the interest of the second marriage. Much of the
difficulty with this presumption has centered around the supposed conflict be-
tween it and the "presumption of continuance of life" o--no presumption at all,
but an inference which may be barred by the presumption of death in order to
validate the second marriage. The spurious presumption "of continuance of
life" is always held to have been overcome. 31
If the death of the former spouse may not be presumed, because of suffi-
cient evidence of his continued life, courts presume that the prior marriage has
- Cases supra notes i5, I6, 17, I8.
" Weatherford v. Weatherford, 2o Ala. 548 (1852) ; Norman v. Goode, 113 Ga. 121, 38
S. E. 317 (Igoi) ; Myatt v. Myatt, supra note 3; In re Mattice's Estate, 147 Misc. 143, 263
N. Y. Supp. 531 (933). Contra: Inhabitants of Camden v. Inhabitants of Belgrade, 75 Me.
126 (1883). The cases are collected in Note (i9o8) i6 L. R. A. (N. s.) 98.
' Hull v. Rawls, supra note i5; Keller v. Linsenmyer, ioi N. J. Eq. 664, 139 Atl. 33
(927) ; Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433 (1848) ; see Brown v. Parks, 173 Ga. 228, 16o S. E.
238 (i93I), (1932) 27 ILL.. L. REv. 2io. It is interesting to inquire how great an improb-
ability will be presumed. No rule can be deduced; but it was held in Reg. v. Inhabitants of
Harborne, 2 A. & E. 540 (Eng. 1835), that proof of the first spouse's being alive twenty-five
days before the second marriage may rebut any presumption of his death prior to that mar-
riage. See Harris v. Harris, 8 Ill. App. 57 (I88O).
- Supra note 15. The court discusses exhaustively the presumption of death. Johnson v.
Johnson, 114 Ill. 6ii, 3 N. E. 232 (1885) (no news for I8 years) semble.
I See Brown v. Parks; Harris v. Harris, both supra note 28; Johnson v. Johnson, supra
note 29.
- Ibid.
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been dissolved by divorce.3 2 It might well be supposed that in earlier times
scruples against divorce might have prevented the application of this presump-
tion. While this presents no obstacle today, some courts have made for them-
selves another difficulty in a presumption of "continuance of the first mar-
riage"3 This differs from presumed continuance of life in that it represents
a social policy; but it, too, usually falls before a desire to validate the second
marriage.3 4 It might better be treated as a mere inference.
Although the presumption in favor of the second marriage is one of law,
it should not be made insuperable. The court approached this extreme in Laza-
rowicz v. Lazarowicz3 5 where it was suggested that after evidence that the
former spouse was living and not divorced, the one attacking the second mar-
riage must next disprove any annulment! The presumption is further mis-
handled where the bad faith of the parties in entering into a common law mar-
riage-the second relationship-is supposed to affect the strength of the pre-
sumption of validity."' A certain factual basis--cohabitation and repute-
must be shown to support the second contract; and in evaluating that evidence
the bad faith of the parties is relevant. If, however, that minimum be demon-
strated to the satisfaction of the jury, the intent should be given no weight by
the judge in diminishing the force of presumptions in favor of the marriage.
The final major case in which courts are moved to presumption by their
wish to find a valid marriage is the situation, perhaps most common of all, where
at the time of the ceremony an impediment existed which prevented the con-
summation of an effective marriage. The rulings in various classes manifest
innumerable variations. There are those situations where the impediment does
not involve a prior marriage: e. g., where one of the parties was at the time
of marriage insane, a slave, drunk, or an infant." Any one of those condi-
tions is sufficient to prevent the making of a valid contract. What, then, will
be the effect of cohabitation and repute as man and wife after the removal of
the impediment? It has been held that by such conduct after sanity returns,38 after
statutory changes permit slaves to marry,8 after the drunken fit passes, 40 or
after majority, 1 the parties ratify their previous marriage, and validate a
marriage which before was only voidable. The use of void and voidable is not
happy; and ratification of a previous marriage contract is a difficult concept.
The same result could have been and should be obtained by presuming an
' Hamlin v. Grogan, 257 Fed. 59 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) ; Chancey v. Whinnery, 47 Okla.
272, 147 Pac. lO36 (9,5). But see Williams v. Williams, supra note 23. Courts sometimes
ignore the presumption: Norton v. O'Neil, 17 S. W. (2d) 66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), (I93O)
8 TEX. L. RFv. 439.
' Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 6oo (1895) ; Shepard v. Carter, 86 Kan. 125,
119 Pac. 533 (91).
' Cases supra note 33. Contra: Wilson v. Allen, lO8 Ga. 275, 33 S. E. 975 (1899) ; In-
dustrial Comm. v. Dell, 1O4 Ohio St. 389, 135 N. E. 669 (1922) (citing no cases) ; see In re
Hamilton, 76 Hun 200, 27 N. Y. Supp. 813 (1894).
91 Misc. 116, 154 N. Y. Supp. lO7 (1915).
Nossaman v. Nossaman, supra note 19.
' There is the further, very rare, case where there was specific statutory prohibition of
the marriage, which bar was later removed. Cohabitation and repute have been held to create
a presumption of a new marriage: In re Biersack, supra note 19.
' Cole v. Cole, 5 Sneed 57 (Tenn. 1857) ; cf. Langdon v. Langdon, 183 N. E. 400 (Ind.
1932) ; Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 410 (1852). Contra: Sims v. Sims, 121 N. C. 297, 28 S.
E. 407 (1897).
Waft v. Sessums, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 183, 66 S. W. 865 (19o2) ; cf. Keen v. Keen, 184
Mo. 358, 83 S. W. 526 (19o4) ; Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68 (1871) semble.
' Prine v. Prine, 36 Fla. 676, 18 So. 781 (1895) (held valid despite the fact that the
woman was a common prostitute).
I Koonce v. Wallace, 52 N. C. 194 (1859) ; State v. Parker, io6 N. C. 711, II S. E. 517
(Isgo).
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exchange of promises, and a valid common law marriage, with the ineffectual
ceremony to furnish still stronger evidence of the marital intent of the parties. 42
A situation in which the courts seem to recognize the inadequacy of the
ratification rationale is presented in the case of cohabitation of two parties who
attempted to bind themselves maritally at a time when one or both of them
was already married. There is no perceptible distinction between that disa-
bility and infancy or insanity; there is the same abstract possibility of ratifica-
tion when the parties become capable of binding themselves; but for some rea-
son courts have chosen not to use "ratification". They have, instead, properly
treated the purported ceremony as of no effect, and seek to find evidence of a
new contract, in the form of a common law agreement, when the parties actually
are competent,43 i. e., when the impediment has been removed by death or di-
vorce. To presume a marriage appears to be no more socially expedient in this
case than in the ordinary situation of cohabitation and repute. The factual
situation must be proved just as clearly as in the case where no impediment is
involved.
The cases where an impediment to the marriage exists fall naturally into
three groups: 4- first, where both parties were ignorant of any bar to their
marriage, and honestly intended marital relationship; second, where one of
the parties knew of the bar, but entered into relations with the other notwith-
standing; 46 and third, where both knew that their marriage was barred because
of prior ties, but nevertheless undertook to hold themselves out as man and
wife.47 A contract will be presumed in the first case when the bar is removed,
whether or not the parties knew of such removal. 48  In the third situation, con-
versely, there must be some evidence of a change of attitude or of a new and
valid agreement when the impediment was removed in order that a marriage
will be presumed.49 In the second situation there is a sharp division of opinion,
with perhaps the slight majority of cases holding that if one party, ignorant of
the bar, is shown to have intended matrimony, continued cohabitation will suffice
to permit finding a new contract. 0 The theory is perfectly consistent with
general principles of presumption of common law marriage. However, there
is danger that the courts may apply it to cases where knowledge of an impedi-
' This was suggested in Bonds v. Foster, supra note 39, at 69.
'Schuchart v. Schuchart, 6I Kan. 597, 6o Pac. 311 (igoo) ; Barker v. Valentine, 125
Mich. 336, 84 N. W. 297 (19oo) ; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige 574 (N. Y. 1841) ; De Thoren v.
Attorney-General. I App. Cas. 686 (1876).
" The classification is suggested in Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 68 N. J. Eq. 414 at 421,
736, 59 Atl. 813 at 815, 62 At. 68o (1905). An analysis of the Pennsylvania decisions along
these lines may be found in Note (1929) 33 Dicx. L. REv. 94.
5 Hill v. Lindsey, 223 Ala. 550, 137 So. 395 (193) ; Webster v. Webster, 114 Okla. 57,
242 Pac. 555 (1926), (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 668.
" Hawkins v. Hawkins, 166 Ga. 153, 142 S. E. 684 (1928) ; Compton v. Benham, 44 Ind.
App. 51, 85 N. E. 365 (1909).
I Thomas' Succession, 144 La. 25, 80 So. 186 (igi) ; Rose v. Rose, 67 Mich. 619, 35 N.
W. 802 (1888).
"Manning v. Spurck, 199 Ill. 447, 65 N. E. 342 (19o2) ; Barker v. Valentine, supra note
43; In re Haffner's Estate, 254 N. Y. 238, 172 N. E. 483 (1930), (93i) 29 MIcH. L. Rrzv.
518; Webster v. Webster, supra note 45; De Thoren v. Attorney-General, supra note 43.
There may be some basis for finding an actual agreement. Schuchart v. Schuchart, supra
note 43.
1Friedenwald v. Friedenwald, 16 F. (2d) 509 (App. D. C. 1926), Note (1927) 12
CORN. L. Q. 513, (1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 579; Hunt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 294 (1878) ; cf. Camp-
bell v. Campbell, I L. R. H. L. Sc. 182 (1867) (the Breadalbane Case).
I Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618, 247 N. W. 9o (933), (1933) I8 MINN. L. Ra. 86;
Phillips v. Wilson, 298 Mo. i86, 5o S. W. 4o8 (1923) ; see Thewlis' Estate, 217 Pa. 3o7, 66
At. 519 (1907) ; Kinney v. Tri-State Telephone Co., 201 S. W. 1I8o (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
Contra: Rice v. Randlett, supra note 23; Compton v. Benham, supra note 46; see Cartwright
v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388, 12 N. E. 737 (1887) ; O'Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296 (1868).
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ment to the union seems to prevent belief in the foufidation of the presump-
tion-cohabitation with matrimonial intent.
A particularly unfortunate suggestion occurs in opinions which speak of
agreements meretricious and illicit as a matter of law, and of charging the
parties with knowledge that their divorces were ineffective. 51  Courts which
start from these premises necessarily hold that a new contract must be found
before the union will be considered valid. 52  In entertaining any such line of
reasoning, the courts ignore the announced purpose of the presumption-which
looks to finding a contract from cohabitation and repute as man and wife. When
that basic fact is shown, and when the parties were in fact ignorant of any bar,
no amount of knowledge chargeable by law should interfere with presumption
of a contract as soon as the parties are in fact capable of contracting."s
Among countless other notions which obscure the real operation and nature
of the presumption of marital validity is the spurious presumption that "rela-
tions illicit in their origin are presumed to continue so until the contrary is
shown". Such a "presumption" is merely an illegitimate substitute for an
inference; 5 its use has been just as unfortunate as that of the "presumption
of the continuance of life", and should be discouraged for the same reasons.
To recapitulate, courts, for the sake of an appearance of morality, seek to
find the existence of the marriage state whenever possible. To do this, they
will presume that a marriage shown to have taken place was valid in all formal
particulars. They will direct the inference of a common law contract of mar-
riage from the evidence of habit and repute. Further, judges will indulge a
strong presumption of the capacity of the parties at the time of the most recent
union-a presumption dividing itself between death and divorce as a means for
dissolution of the former marriage. Finally, when an impediment is shown to
have existed at the time of the agreement, but was subsequently removed, courts
will presume the contracting of a common law marriage subsequent to the re-
moval of such impediment. At times, these presumptions are strained unmerci-
fully; much would be gained if some norm could be discovered; but judicial
habit has crystallized into unconscionable rules which seem to be fixtures in the
law of evidence.
One final word may be added about the force of these presumptions. All
are strong-the policy behind them is one near to the judge's heart. The pre-
sumption of compliance with formal requirements is one which will prevail until
definite evidence is introduced tending to show that there was some defect in
the ceremony.5 6 Until that time, the presumption will justify a directed verdict
for the party in whose favor it'operates. Thereafter, the question becomes
one for the jury.5 7  The presumption that the parties were in fact capable of
contracting marriage is equally strong; proof advanced against it must extend
'Voorhees v. Voorhees, 46 N. J. Eq. 411, 47 N. J. Eq. 315, 19 AtI. 172, 2o Atl. 676
(i89o) ; Collins v. Voorhees, 47 N. J. Eq. 555, 22 Atl. 1054 (89o).
r Ibid.
' Poole v. People, 24 Colo. 51o, 52 Pac. 1025 (1898) ; Smith v. Reed, 145 Ga. 724, 89
S. E. 815 (1916).
' Adger v. Ackerman, supra note 5; Sebree v. Sebree, 293 Ill. 228, 127 N. E. 392 (ig2o);
Bannister v. Bannister, 150 S. C. 411, 148 S. E. 228 (1929).
Darling v. Dent, 82 Ark. 76, 100 S. W. 747 (19o7) ; see Clark v. Barney, 24 Okla. 455,
,03 Pac. 598 (9o9).
' Courts usually demand "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary": It re Meg-
ginson's Estate, supra note 8, at 393, 28 Pac. at 389. Perhaps the most often-quoted phrases
are: "Clear, distinct and satisfactory", Lord Brougham in Piers v. Piers, supra note 9, at
370; "By disproving every reasonable possibility", Lord Campbell in the same case at 38o.
But cf. Adams v. Win. Cameron & Co., supra note 9.
'Theoretically, presumptions should not persist so long; but some do. See Bohlen;
Morgan, both supra note IO.
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even to reasonable proof of the negative proposition that no divorce had been
granted.* Production of such evidence likewise destroys the presumption, and
permits submission of the question of validity to the jury. As for the presump-
tion of a common daw marriage, or of a new contract from cohabitation and
repute after removal of an impediment, the diversity and confusion are so great
that an attempted generalization would be futile.
These presumptions are important in the law; around each clusters a myriad
of satellites which do not, of themselves, deserve to be named presumptions.
They represent a policy entrenched behind a multitude of decisions; they stand
out as the most prominent features in a field of the law of evidence extraor-
dinary for its confusion and fallacies. It is impossible even to point to some
tendency from which one might hope for a clarification of this unbelievably
muddled situation.
H. .E. S.
INSOLVENCY OF THE VENDOR AS A GROUND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-
Where a vendor is in default under a contract for the sale of goods, and he is
likewise insolvent, in the sense that a judgment against him will be virtually
uncollectible,' it is highly important for the vendee to secure specific perform-
ance, since otherwise any loss which he sustains by reason of the breach will be
substantially without redress. Broadly speaking, the jurisdiction to grant such
relief will depend on whether the vendee's remedy at law for damages is con-
sidered adequate. 2 Consequently, the initial problem involved is the determina-
tion of whether the failure to realize on a judgment makes the remedy at law
so inadequate that Equity will provide relief.
It is important, at this point, to recognize that even where strict jurisdiction
exists, the exercise of that jurisdiction is often within the discretion of the chan-
cellor.3 Although specific performance may become a matter of course after
a sufficient repetition of a given set of facts has resulted in a compelling prece-
dent, as in the case of contracts for the sale of land, this discretion quite prop-
erly becomes of real force in novel or otherwise difficult situations. As a result,
in view of the fact that a "rule" for the exercise of discretion would be a para-
dox, it is possible only to evolve accurate bases and desirable limits for the
proper exercise of such discretion.
c' Marsh v. Marsh, supra note 22 (proof that wife had not procured, or been notified of,
a divorce held insufficient) ; Wingo v. Rudder, supra note 14 (showing that first wife had
procured divorce some years after her husband's remarriage held not to disturb the pre-
sumption, although the presumed divorce could have been obtained only by false testimony) ;
Pittinger v. Pittinger, supra note 14 semble. The presumption is also treated as one which
requires the production of only slight evidence to rebut it: Turner v. Williams? 202 Mass.
Soo, 89 N. E. i1O (igog). Unclassifiable decisions and tests range between these extremes.
See Note (19i1) 34 L. R. A. (x. s.) 94o, collecting decisions.
'The term "insolvency" will be used throughout in this general sense, rather than as
the term is employed in specific insolvency or bankruptcy statutes. The CONTRACTS RESTATE-
ISENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) § 287 (2) defines insolvency simply as the inability to meet
debts as they mature. For the various definitions of "insolvency" see 32 C. J. 8o5, and cases
there cited.
- It is true that equitable jurisdiction is largely founded on whether the type of contract
is one which equity has traditionally enforced, e. g., contracts for the sale of land. If,
however, it can be shown that damages for the breach of any particular contract will not
be adequate, as where a chattel of unique value is involved, specific performance will be
awarded. See WALSH, EQUITY (1930) §8 58, 6o; STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (03th ed.
1886) § 717.
a4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 14o4; WALSH, EQUITY (1930)
C. xi.
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The flexible character of equitable relief no doubt accounts, at least in part,
for the wide divergence of opinion disclosed in decisions dealing with the prob-
lem here considered. Several courts have refused to recognize insolvency even
as a factor in determining whether specific performance will be awarded, chiefly
on the ground that "adequacy" of the remedy at law refers only to the possibility
of proceeding to a judgment against the vendor.4 This view is hardly justifiable.
Damages for breach of contract are intended to put the injured party in the
position in which he would have been had the contract been performed. This
is shown in the very method by which damages for the breach are measured.
The same underlying concept is indicated in the refusal of Equity to award
specific performance where the vendee could take the money damages which
he obtains at law and purchase elsewhere goods similar to those for which he
has bargained.5 But even damages are only a makeshift for real performance;
and while.equity jurisprudence has become too well settled to advocate the grant
of specific performance in every case at the option of the vendee," nevertheless
any concept of "adequacy" which disregards the possible failure to realize any-
thing from a judgment is too completely unrealistic to satisfy the practical re-
quirements of the problems which Equity must solve. Furthermore, if, as was
long ago stated, Equity will award relief wherever the remedy at law is not as
"plain and adequate . . . as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice and
its prompt administration, as the remedy at equity" 7 -a widely cited view-
then the true compensatory value of the judgment for damages must, at the
very least, be considered in determining the "adequacy" of such remedy.
A more difficult problem arises, however, in determining what weight
should be attributed to the fact of insolvency, as compared with other facts
which might render the vendee's remedy at law inadequate. In this connection
it will be convenient to take up together two classes of cases-those which pur-
port to grant specific performance on the ground of insolvency alone, and those
which treat insolvency only as a "makeweight", insufficient by itself, but capable
of turning the balance in a close case. It is difficult as well as artificial, of
course, to segregate any one ground as the basis for a court's grant of specific
performance. Even in a relatively obvious case a party will allege as many
conceivable grounds for relief as possible; and an appellate court is in most
instances reluctant to rest its conclusion on a single circumstance. Neverthe-
less, some inquiry into the relative importance of insolvency as compared with
other grounds for granting specific performance is feasible; and it would seem
that this treatment is essential for any accurate analysis of the problem as a
whole.
'McLaughlin v. Piatti, 27 Cal. 451 (1865) ; Hendry v. Whidden, 48 Fla. 268, 37 So.
571 (904); Cincinnati & Chicago R. R. v. Washburn, 25 Ind. 259 (1865); Warren Co. v.
Black Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 684, lO2 S. E. 672 (I92o); see Dills v. Doebler, 62 Conn. 366,
370 (5892). In Thompson v. Allen County, 115 U. S. 550, 554 (1885) the court said:
"By inadequacy of the remedy at law is here meant not that it fails to produce the money
. . . but that in its nature or character it is not adapted to the end in view." This case,
however, was a suit by the creditor of a municipality to collect taxes directly, and was not
therefore an action for specific performance in the ordinary sense.
'Southern Iron Co. v. Vaughn, 2O Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918); see Ridenbaugh v.
Thayer, 5O Idaho 662, 672, 8o Pac. 229, 232 (19o5); WALSH, EQUITY (i930) § 6o; 3
WIULSTON, CONTRACTS (1922) § 5419.
' This is substantially the view of the Civil Law. WALSH, EQUITY (1930) § 63. So
also the German Civil Code. ScnusTER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CIVIL LAW (1907) § 167.
It has been pointed out by several writers that the remedy for specific performance arose
considerably earlier in the common law than that for damages. See Barbour, The "Right"
to Break a Contract (0917) 16 MICH. L. Rav. i06; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 522 et. seq.
' Boyce's Ex'rs v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 255 (U. S. 183o). This statement has been
cited or paraphrased in a very great number of cases.
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Clark v. Flint most nearly approaches a case where insolvency alone was
held by the court to be ground for specific performance." It is true that a ship,
or an interest therein, which was the subject matter involved, has been declared
unique, in the sense that land is looked upon as unique.9 Consequently, specific
performance might have been awarded on this ground alone; but the court
stated plainly 10 that the fact of the vendor's insolvency was considered the
dominant if not the exclusive ground for specific performance, the possibly
unique character of the subject matter remaining without mention.
A number of decisions which treat the fact of insolvency merely as a"makeweight" give specific performance because of a purported combination of
insolvency with other grounds for equitable relief when in fact such other
grounds do not exist. Typical cases are those in which the parties have con-
tracted for the sale of crops or other goods to be acquired in the future, the
vendee often paying part or all of the purchase price in advance. In suits for
specific performance, the vendor being insolvent, courts have held that the
vendor became the vendee's trustee for the goods; 11 that the vendee had an
"equitable property" in or an "equitable lien" upon the goods;12 that the vendor
and vendee became partners in a joint venture, 13 or tenants in common with re-
spect to the goods. For any one or more of these "reasons", plus the fact of
insolvency, specific performance was granted.
In all these cases it would seem that the only real ground for awarding
specific performance is the insolvency of the vendor. It has been clearly rec-
ognized that the so-called "equitable title" springs from the very right of the
vendee to secure specific performance. 4 It becomes obviously illogical, there-
fore, to base a decree of specific performance on the existence of such "equi-
table title".
Likewise, the theory underlying constructive trusts (and any trust aris-
ing in the above cases can hardly be other than constructive) indicates that they
are remedial in nature, rather than substantive, as in the case of an express
trust. Some courts have indeed been frank enough to state that a trust will
be deliberately constructed where specific performance is thought desirable and
no usual grounds for specific performance are present.15 Naturally, a court will
822 Pick. 231 (Mass. 1839). Very few cases state directly that insolvency alone will
be ground for specific performance. Dicta to this effect can be found in McNamara v.
Home Land & Cattle Co., lO5 Fed. 202, 207 (C. C. D. Mont. 19oo) rev'd on other grounds,
112 Fed. 822 (C. C. A. 9th, 19Ol) ; Petrolia Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, 29 App. Div. 403, 408, 51
N. Y. Supp. lO28, 1O31 (i88). The cases are collected in 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1922)
§ 1420 n., but the decisions there cited chiefly represent dicta, cases where additional grounds
are stated, and cases in which specific performance was refused for the reason inter alia
that insolvency was not alleged.
'Menier v. Donald, 98 Misc. 684, 165 N. Y. Supp. 5o (917); Note I9i8E L. R. A.
621. For a brief discussion of contracts for the transfer of a ship see POM ROY, SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1897) 67.
1" ,. on what plausible ground can it be contended that a judgment against an
insolvent contractor is an adequate remedy? It would be manifestly against equity and
justice for a court to decline jurisdiction in such a case." Clark v. Flint, supra note 9,
at 238.
' Parker v. Garrison, 61 Ill. 250 (1871); Draper v. Stone, 71 Me. 175 (188o); see
Livesley v. Johnston, 45 Ore. 30, 52, 76 Pac. 946, 951 (1904).
'Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry., 213 U. S. 126, 29 Sup. Ct. 466 (19o9). See Zeiger
v. Stephenson, 153 N. C. 528, 529, 69 S. E. 611, 612 (191o).
'Schmitt v. Cassilius, 31 Minn. 7, 16 N. W. 453 (1883) (rev'd on other grounds);
Livesley v. Heise, 45 Ore. 148, 76 Pac. 952 (1904) ; Livesley v. Johnston, supra note i1.
"Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 679 (1927) ; see Edwards v. West, 7 Ch.
D. 858, 862 (Eng. 1878). See further Clark, Specific Performance in Connection With
Receiverships (1919) 33 H~Av. L. REv. 64, at 68.
'In Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 169, 182 Pac. 333 (1919) the court stated:
"Though specific performance in the literal sense of the term, cannot be given in this class
of actions, nevertheless a court of equity, where the facts justify, may grant relief substan-
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not adopt such an attitude unless moved strongly by the justness of the vendee's
contention, and the insolvency of the vendor has been, at least on a few occa-
sions, of sufficient influence to secure the result sought.'"
It should be noted that other courts, dealing with the same situation, do not
find a "trust" or "equitable interest" and refuse to grant specific performance.
17
Some of these courts, nevertheless, give lip-service to insolvency as a "factor"
in the award of specific performance,' s although it is not stated what circum-
stances, when added to the fact of insolvency, will be sufficient ground for equi-
table relief.
The view that a partnership or "joint venture" arises in the situations referred
to above is of little assistance. If it be conceded that such a relationship is cre-
ated, then it becomes difficult to see why any contract for the sale of future goods,
where payment is made in advance, cannot be considered a partnership-a result
which appears obviously contrary to accepted theories of partnership or sales.19
In contrast with the view that insolvency plus non-existent additional cir-
cumstances will warrant specific enforcement, are opinions which acknowledge
-unnecessarily-the "makeweight" effect of insolvency where other factors in
the cases would alone have been sufficient to support the decisions reached. A
good example is Texas Co. v. Central Fuel Oil Co.2" Here the court stated the
familiar dogma of insolvency as a mere "makeweight" 21 but gave specific per-
formance because of the "added" element in the uncertainty of damages. This
latter ground, however, is in its ozn right a widely-recognized reason for grant-
ing specific performance, so that the relative weight to be ascribed to insolvency
as a factor is again impossible of determination. In a similar category are cases
where there was insolvency plus the fact that the chattels which were the sub-
ject of the contract were unique; 22 insolvency in the case of a contract for the
sale of real property; 23 and insolvency where the possible damages were spec-
ulative in character and the vendee would be put to a multiplicity of actions.2 4
These cases, which, it is believed, represent the decisions directly 29 involving
the problem, indicate the difficulties inherent in the theory which treats insolv-
ency as a "makeweight" in determining the award of specific performance. Espe-
cially as developed by the courts, this view can easily lead to the decision of a
case largely by the form which the pleadings take-an allegation of one of these
tially the same as specific performance, by treating the heirs as trustees and compelling
them to convey the property in accordance with the terms of the contract." See Signaigo
v. Signaigo, 2o5 S. W. 23, 29 (Mo. 1918). See also Pound, The Progress of the Law,
1918-1919: Equity (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 42o. Cf. Aetna Indemnity Co. v. Malone, 89
Neb. 26o, 131 N. W. 200 (IgII).
"See cases supra note ii.
Bowman v. Adams, supra note 14; McLaughlin v. Piatti; Hendry v. Whidden;
Warren v. Black Coal Co., all supra note 4.
Bowman v. Adams, supra note 14.
MECHEM, PARTNERSHIP (2d ed. 1920) §§ I2, 13; UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr, § 7 (2).
194 Fed. i (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
'Id. at ii.
-Hogg v. McGuffin, 67 W. Va. 456, 68 S. E. 41 (1910).
Meyer v. Reed, 91 N. J. Eq. 237, io9 At]. 733 (1920).
Petrolia Mfg. Co. v. Jenkins, supra note 9.
In Beeman v. Hexter, 98 Iowa 378, 67 N. W. 270 (2896), and Zimmerman v. Gerzog,
13 App. Div. 210, 43 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1897), contracts not to re-enter a business, with a
stipulation for liquidated damages, were enforced by injunction. In each case insolvency of
the defendant was stated as a ground for relief. Contra: Dills v. Doebler, supra note 4. In
contracts for the transfer of property as security for a debt insolvency is frequently consid-
ered a ground for specific performance. Rothholz v. Schwartz, 46 N. J. Eq. 477 (890) ;
Klitten v. Stewart, 225 Wash. 186, 225 Pac. 513 (1923). But it has been stated that specific
performance should be granted in general in this type of contract, because of its special
nature, and because the parties have in effect stipulated that damages shall not be adequate
compensation. CLARK, EQuiTY (i919) § 5,; WALsHa, EQUITY (i930) § 62.
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"additional" factors might be enough to turn the result in favor of specific per-
formance. Of course, this approach can always be justified on the ground that
courts are perfectly aware of its real nature, and employ it simply as a means
to decide a given case in accordance with their ideas of the merits. Unquestion-
ably courts are moved by the vendee's plight when the vendor is insolvent, but
they are reluctant to state outspokenly that they will take jurisdiction to award
specific performance solely on the ground of insolvency, possibly because of the
fear which Walsh has expressed thus:
"Such a doctrine would turn over to equity all actions at law for dam-
ages where this financial condition [insolvency] of the defendant could be
established, whether in tort or contract, and none of the cases establish any
such doctrine." 28
Whatever the foundation for its existence, this reluctance on the part of
equity courts appears to some extent inconsistent with the attitude exhibited in
other situations where the inability to realize on an admittedly possible remedy
at law is a usual if not exclusive basis for equitable intervention. Thtis, where
a party to a contract which includes a promise negative in form refuses to
complete the contract, by doing or threatening to do an act forbidden in the
agreement, Equity will usually grant an injunction to restrain the breach of
such promise if it is shown that the defendant is insolvent.2 7  Such relief is
plainly in effect the specific performance of a negative promise.2 It is true
that the prevention of threatened harm is a general basis for equitable jurisdic-
tion,"' but the insolvency of the defendant is so much a ground for the exercise
of this jurisdiction that some courts have declared proof of the defendant's
insolvency is an essential requirement for securing relief.8 0 In the case of "ex-
clusive sale" contracts, which make up a large part of the decisions in this
group, even positive relief may be achieved, since an injunction forbidding the
sale of the goods in question to anyone but the vendee under the contract will
either compel eventual transfer to the latter or force the vendor to cease oper-
ations altogether.
The doctrines of equitable set-off and stoppage in transitu, both of which
will be discussed subsequently in another connection,"' again illustrate Equity's
willingness to consider a defendant's poor financial condition sufficient cause for
judicial intervention.
As Professor Horack has pointed out, the reluctance of Equity to take jur-
isdiction on the ground of insolvency lies possibly in a confusion between the
existence of jurisdiction and its exercise.2  Even if it should be conceded that
insolvency alone is ground for specific performance, it does not follow that
-'WAL H, EQUITY (1930) § 63.
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Sloane, 155 App. Div. 580, 14o N. Y. Supp. 858 (1913) ; Zeiger
v. Stephenson, 153 N. C. 528, 69 S. E. 61I (gio) ; see Christian Feigenspan v. Nizolek, 71
N. J. Eq. 382, 399, 65 Atl. 703, 709 (1907). In this last case Pitney, V. C., stated at 399, 65
Atl. at 709: "A reference . . . will show, what is perfectly well settled, that in consider-
ing the question of what is an adequate remedy at law, the courts will take into considera-
tion, not only the multiplicity of suits, but also the pecuniary responsibility of the defendant."
Contra: Smith v. Howell, 91 Ore. 279, 176 Pac. 8o5 (1918).
I "A suit in equity to enforce a negative covenant is actually one for specific perform-
ance while not so in form." Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 18, 153 N. E. 99, I0O
(1926). See Dills v. Doebler, supra note 4, at 368. See also 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1922) § 1445.
-2 STORY, EQUITY JURiSPRUDLNcE (4th ed. 1918) § 1182.
"See Yount v. Setzer, 155 N. C. 213, 217, 71 S. E. 209, 211 (1911).
See infra p. 520 et seq.
' This distinction, as related to the general problem of insolvency in cases of specific
performance, is well treated in Horack, Insolvency and Specific Perfornmnce (1918) 31
H-Iv. L. Rzv. 702. See also McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law (1932)
16 MINN'. L. REV. 233.
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such relief must be granted whenever the vendor is insolvent. Despite the pres-
ence of a well-accepted ground for equitable relief that relief has often been
refused where its grant would work an undue hardship on third parties,83 the
public, 34 or produce what the chancellor deems an "inequitable" result as a
whole."
Obviously the removal of what might be the chief asset of the insolvent will
diminish the proportionate amount which the vendor's creditors can receive,
while the vendee will be paid substantially in full. Without doubt, such a result
is contrary to the intent of the bankruptcy statutes, as well as to the maxim
"Equality is Equity". Principally for this reason, indeed, one group of deci-
sions holds that insolvency is a sufficient ground for denying specific perform-
ance.3 6 The question of possible preferences and the extent of their effect in the
great variety of factual situations becomes, then, the ultimate problem to be
resolved.
It may be that the vendor has no other creditors,? in which case, of course,
the question of a preference is not involved, and specific performance should
be granted if no other valid reason for denying relief appears. It has also been
pointed out " that the vendor, while not technically insolvent, in the sense that
his assets are greater than his liabilities, may be execution-proof. 9 Since credi-
tors could not in such case reach any of the vendor's property, they are in no
worse position if specific performance is granted to the vendee than if it is re-
fused. The same conclusion would, of course, follow where the vendor is both
insolvent and execution-proof. Assuming, however, that there are creditors,
and that the vendor is not execution-proof, it becomes apparent that some pref-
erence in favor of the vendee over the creditors of the vendor must inevitably
result if specific performance is awarded. Does it necessarily follow that spe-
cific performance should be refused?
Here again it would seem desirable to point out that there are several sit-
uations in which Equity sanctions what in fact amounts to a preference, sonorous
maxims to the contrary notwithstanding. To the instance of constructive trusts,
already mentioned, there can be added the more striking doctrine of equitable
set-off. If an insolvent plaintiff brings an action, and the defendant has a coun-
terclaim which for some reason does not fall within the provisions of the set-off
statute, Equity will nevertheless permit the set-off.4 0 The recent widespread
' Curran v. Holyoke Water Power Co., I16 Mass. go (1874). See Horack, supra note
33, at 705.
Conger v. New York, W. S. & B. R. R., 12o N. Y. 29, 23 N. E. 983 (i8go) ; Heilman
v. Union Canal Co., 37 Pa. ioo (I86O).
FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (6th ed. 1921) 185 et seq.; WALSH, EQUITY (1930) § 104.
Roundtree v. McLain, Hemp. 245 (C. C. D. Ark. 1834) ; Block v. Shaw, 78 Ark. 511,
95 S. W. 8o6 (i9o6) ; City Fire Ins. Co. v. Olmsted, 33 Conn. 476 (1866) ; Chafee v. Sprague,
16 R. I. 189 (1888). The latter two cases were actions against insolvent estates, and may be
explained by this fact since Equity, in the special case of administering insolvent estates,
apportioned the latter equally among the creditors. See GLENN, RIGHTS & REMIEDIES OF
CREDITORS RESPECTING THEIR DEBTOR'S PROPERTY (915) § 294.
' The mere fact that such creditors do not appear in the action should not mean that the
possibility of their existence should be disregarded, as was intimated in Triebert v. Burgess,
Ii Md. 452 (857).
Clark, Some Problems in Specific Performance (1917) 31 HARV. L. REV. 271, at 275.
"E. g., where the vendor-debtor has property worth $2ooo, debts of $1ooo and is entitled
to a statutory exemption of $3000. Prof. Clark concedes, however, that it might be contrary
to the spirit of the exemption laws to grant specific performance in such a case. In addition,
the grant of specific performance may so impair the vendor's assets that any possibility of
future payment to his creditors would thereby be cut off.
"' Gray v. School District, 67 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933) ; People v. California Safe
D. & T. Co., 168 Cal. 241, 141 Pac. 1181 (1914) ; Frantz v. Brown, I P. & W. 257 (Pa.
i83o). See 2 LAwRENCE, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE (1920) § 1077; WATERMAN, SET-OFF
(1869) §§ 395, 396, and cases there cited.
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failure of banks throughout the country has served to emphasize the glaring
preference thus created. One who owes money to an insolvent bank is per-
mitted to set off his deposit therein against his obligation, even though the sit-
uation is one which does not strictly fall within the set-off statutes.41 His de-
posit can therefore be liquidated, perhaps completely, depending on the sums
involved, while the return to other depositors may be but an insignificant frac-
tion of their funds on deposit in the insolvent institution.
A similar if less conspicuous preference results from the principle of stop-
page in transitu. Under this rule, which had its origin in Equity,42 but is now
a part of the law, 43 after title to goods sold has passed to the vendee, but while
the goods are still in transit, the vendor can reclaim the property if he discovers
the buyer is insolvent. Admittedly, the sole ground for this doctrine is the un-
fairness of compelling the vendor to resort to a fruitless action at law-a situa-
tion which, of course, confronts the insolvent's remaining creditors.
Moreover, where a person is insolvent, and knows himself to be so, he can
nevertheless make a valid sale of his property, and in the absence of collusion
or fraud such transfer will be unaffected by his subsequent adjudication as a
bankrupt.44 On this ground, in cases where the contract is purely executory
Professor Williston suggests 45 that specific performance should be granted, for
the reason that the assets of the insolvent will not thereby be diminished since
they are replaced by or exchanged for the cash received as the price. There is,
however, a possible objection to this view. The price paid will, of course, be
that named in the contract. It is almost certain that this will be less than the
market price, since if it were greater than the latter it would be foolish for the
vendee to insist on specific performance; if the two prices coincide there would
also be little reason for undertaking a lawsuit to secure the goods, unless, in
either case, the goods involved are unique. Consequently, the assets of the in-
solvent would in a number of cases be diminished by the difference between the
market price and the contract price of the goods. There is in addition a prac-
tical objection arising from the greater ease afforded a vendor in concealing or
dissipating assets in the form of cash than in the form of the property itself.
If the vendee has paid the purchase price wholly or partly in advance he
is more likely to receive the sympathy of a court, as indicated previously in the
discussion of insolvency as a "makeweight" ground for specific performance.48
In fact, it has been stated that Equity should grant specific performance here
in order to prevent a preference in favor of the vendor's creditors, since other-
wise they would be "unjustly enriched" by the purchase price which the vendor
has simply pocketed. 47  This conclusion, however, is hardly tenable. In the
first place, the money received as the purchase price may have been disbursed by
the vendor in any number of ways, so that it never was available or paid to his
creditors. More important, it is clear that the position of the vendee who has
parted with money, but received no goods, is almost exactly that of the vendor's
other creditors, who have parted with property and have received no money.
It might be suggested that the vendee's loss would be relatively more severe
where he has contracted elsewhere in reliance upon the receipt of the goods in
question and will be liable for special damages for non-fulfillment of such con-
'Gray v. School District; People v. California Safe D. & T. Co., both supra note 40.
'Wiseman v. Vandeputt, z Vern. 202 (Eng. 16go) ; D'Aquila v. Lambert, i Amb. 399
(Eng. 1761).
IIn re Burke & Co., 14o Fed. 97I (D. C. W. D. Pa. 19o5) ; Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa.
254 (1858); UN'IFORM SALES Ace, §§ 54, 57; 2 WILusTON, SALES (zd ed. 1924) §§ 5o4, 518.
"3 WmLIsToN, CONTRAcTS (1922) § i420.
"Ibid.
J See cases supra notes 12, 13, 14 and 15.
"'Note (19o5) 18 HARv. L. REv. 454.
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tract. But it is equally conceivable that the general creditor, too, may have
made commitments in reliance upon prompt payment by the insolvent.
It should be apparent that questions relating to the effect of possible pref-
erences cannot be answered solely on the basis of whether the vendee has per-
formed the contract, in whole or in part. So many varying factors may be
present in the unlimited number of possible factual situations that only by the
closest inspection of all the circumstances can a truly just result be attained.
The problem here considered has received little legislative attention.4S Mary-
land has expressly enacted that where a defendant in a suit for specific perform-
ance relies on the adequacy of plaintiff's legal remedy the defendant must show
that he has sufficient assets to satisfy a possible judgment, or a bond for such
latter amount must be furnished.49 A number of states have provided for spe-
cific performance at the option of the vendee in the special case of contracts
for the sale of agricultural products to co-operative marketing associations.
With these exceptions the question is untouched by the legislatures.,;, More-
over, little can be expected from this source beyond, perhaps, a statute affirming
the existence of strict jurisdiction, because the propriety of the relief is too
much dependent upon the facts of each case.
For example, it may appear that the vendee has made payments in advance
as a well-meant effort to help the vendor out of financial difficulties-an objec-
tive distinctly for the benefit of the vendor's creditors. It may be a beneficial
policy in such a case to grant the vendee specific performance. A court may
even feel that notwithstanding the refusal of specific performance the pro rata
share of each creditor will still be so small in actual amount that to reduce it
further by granting specific performance, and thus satisfying one claimant at
least, will make but little real difference to the creditors. Fanciful as such spec-
ulation may seem, the infinitesimal sums realized from bankrupt estates make
it unfortunately realistic from the point of view of the creditor at least.
In summary, a careful analysis should be made at the outset with regard
to the question of preference to determine whether a particular case falls in a
class where a preference can in fact arise. Within the categories where a pref-
erence is possible, only the broad principle that no preference unjustifiable under
the circumstances should be created can be offered by way of a guide. This is
substantially the view of the Contracts Restatenent,52 and while admittedly
vague it has the highly important advantage of allowing the fullest possible
inquiry into the factual situation of a given case and in addition permits of
a wide discretion on the part of the court. The chancellor will undoubtedly
be called upon to examine and weigh a much greater mass of factual minutiae
than a court is accustomed to consider. The nature of the problem and the
conflicting equities involved, however, hardly make this objection compelling.
F.P.G.
'The question of specific performance against a bankrupt will not be treated here. For
discussion of this topic see Clark, supra note 39. See also 3 WILISTON, CONTRACrS (1922)
§ i42o for suggestion that where vendee has paid in advance he becomes a creditor of the
vendor, so that if the latter is insolvent the grant of specific performance would amount to
a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Act.
"MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. i6, § 246.
' TENN. CODE (Williams, Shannon, Harsh, 1933) § 7810 (applies to contracts for the
sale of farm products in general); TEX. CoMP. STAT. (Vernon, Ig28) art. 5753; UTAH
REV. STAT. (i933) tit. 2, § 6 (1); WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 2892.
MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 8717 provides that in suits for specific performance
there is a presumption that money damages are an inadequate remedy in contracts concerning
land, and an adequate remedy in contracts concerning personal property
'CONTRACES RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1932) §362. "The degree of probability
that damages awarded 'cannot in fact be collected" is stated as a factor in determining
whether the remedy at law is adequate. § 361 (d).
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CONVERSION OF SHARES OF STOcK-Whatever may be thought of the wis-
dom of its introduction into the law, the conclusion that shares of stock are
subject to conversion has become well settled in every jurisdiction.Y Since the
common law principles of conversion and the remedy of trover, essentially
concerned with the right of possession, can be applied to the rights incident to
or known as "share ownership" by analogy at best, it is at once obvious that
courts have or have had a broad discretion as to what situations they will apply
the analogy. The purpose of this note is to survey the cases to discover what
incidents of share ownership courts have felt it desirable to protect by this
remedy and what interference with or infringement of them will be regarded
as a conversion.
Among the incidents of share ownership, the right to possession of a share
certificate is probably most akin to that protected by the common law remedy
of trover. Early Pennsylvania decisions refused to go beyond the logical con-
clusion that a wrongful taking, or a wrongful detention after demand, of a
share certificate constituted a conversion of only the certificate, a thing capable
of possession. 2  Other courts, however, were quite willing to identify the cer-
tificate with the shares for this purpose and to hold that the shares were con-
verted.3 But if the certificate in such a situation was'unindorsed and neither
the wrongdoer nor a bona fide transferee could acquire any rights under it, the
courts were uniform in following Judge Cooley's decision 4 that this constituted
a conversion of the certificate as distinguished from the shares.5 In 1932, how-
ever, the Court of Appeals of New York came to the opposite conclusion in
Pierpoint v. Hoyt." In that case the defendants refused to surrender to the
plaintiff certificates of stock which they had acquired in good faith and for value
after they had been stolen from plaintiff and his indorsement forged. Plaintiff
had notified the corporations of the theft, directed them to stop any attempted
transfer, and apparently had been denied none of his rights as a shareholder.
In holding the defendants guilty of conversion of the shares and overruling the
Appellate Division's limitation of recovery to the expense involved and the dam-
ages actually proved to result from the wrongful detention,7 the court said:
"Indorsement facilitated disposal. It did not change the essential na-
ture of the certificates. Wrongful acts affecting property rights in cor-
porate stock can ordinarily be committed only through the medium of the
certificates which evidence these rights. For the purpose of redressing such
'Arkansas A. C. & L. Co. v. Stokes, 2 F. (2d) 511. (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Ralstor, v.
Bank of California, 112 Cal. 208, 44 Pac. 476 (1896) ; Budd v. Multnomah St. Ry., 12 Ore.
271, 7 Pac. 99 (885) ; II FLErrcHER, CYcLoPni1A CoRPORATIoNs (Perm. ed. 1932) §§ 5115,
5116.
2 Neiler v. Kelley, 69 Pa. 403 (1871) ; see also Sewall v. Lancaster Bank, 17 S. & R. 285,
287 (Pa. 1828). Conversion of shares is now well recognized in Pennsylvania. See Gervis
v. Kay, 294 Pa. 518, 144 Atl. 529 (1928), and cases cited therein.
' Payne v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 339 (I88O) ; Morton v. Preston, i8 Mich. 6o (1869) ; Condou-
ris v. Imperial T. T. & C. Co., 3 Misc. 66, 22 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1893).
'Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, iS N. W. 548 (1884).
2 Shewalter v. Wood, 183 S. W. 1127 (Mo. App. 1916) ; Davidson v. Atmar, 243 S. W.
662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Pardee v. Nelson, 59 Utah 497, 205 Pac. 332, 21 A. L. R. 385
(1922).
6260 N. Y. 26, 182 N. E. 235 (1932).
7 Pierpoint v. Farnum, 234 App. Div. 2o5, 254 N. Y. Supp. 758 (1931). Under the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act § i, delivery of the certificate is necessary to effect the sale of
shares. See N. Y. PEas. PROP. LAW (1909) § 162. It is only where the value of the shares
has dropped considerably that there will be appreciable difference in damages ultimately, since
in trover the defendant becomes owner of the shares. Otherwise he would be ,forced to pay
damages and gain nothing.
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wrongs, the law must and does treat the symbol as though it were the thing
symbolized." 8
At common law the right invaded by the wrongful detention of a certifi-
cate was identical whether it was indorsed or not, since even an indorsed cer-
tificate was non-negotiable.' But factually the ability of the holder to dispose
of the certificate may be increased if it is indorsed. The Uniform Stock Trans-
fer Act has made certificates of stock negotiable when indorsed, 0 so that in those
states which have adopted the Act, the presence of an indorsement may justify
a difference in result. Yet it is to be noted that the distinction grew up in juris-
dictions where the common law principles were prevailing.
It was early recognized that the ownership of shares included not only the
right to recover a certificate, but also the right to acquire a certificate of owner-
ship, the refusal to issue which courts held a conversion of the shares by the
corporation.'- But a corporation is justified in refusing to issue a certificate
to one who produces no proof of ownership of the shares.'- The corporation
has, also, a right to an indemnifying bond before issuing a new certificate to
one from whom a certificate has been stolen or who has lost it.1' The fact that
an incorporator agreed to pledge his shares with the corporation as collateral
security for certain notes has been held no defense to an action for conversion
for failure to issue the certificates. 14 In London Bank v. Aronstein,'5 it was
held that the corporation's refusal to issue certificates to plaintiff in her name
as executrix of the testator's estate constituted a conversion of the shares. Al-
though the opinion was not as clear on the point as might be desired, the court
apparently stated that it was immaterial that plaintiff as executrix could by law
have exercised such "privileges" as that of voting or of being elected to cor-
porate office, inasmuch as she "was entitled to dividends, if any, on the shares
of stock, and she was entitled to have the shares transferred upon the books of
the company to enable her to draw such dividends." 16 The authority of this
case appears to have been of strong influence in the recent case of Veatch v.
North European Oil Corp.,'" now pending appeal before the Supreme Court
of Delaware. In that case plaintiff owned shares of stock subject to a contract
with defendant corporation not to dispose of them before a certain date without
the consent of A and B. When defendant changed its name and issued new
certificates to the shareholders, it sent plaintiff a certificate with the contractual
restriction on alienation written upon it, although this had not been written on
the old certificate which plaintiff had surrendered. He refused to accept this
and demanded a "clean" certificate, which defendant would not issue to him.
It was held that this constituted a conversion of plaintiff's shares, the remedy
I Supra note 6, at 29, 182 N. E. at 236.
'East Birmingham Land Co. v. Dennis, 85 Ala. 565, 5 So. 317 (I88g) ; Barstow v. Savage
Mining Co., 64 Cal. 388, I Pac. 349 (1883) ; Barstow v. City Trust Co., 216 Mass. 330, 103
N. E. 911 (1914) ; cf. Lilly v. Sterling Oil & Ref. Co., io8 Kan. 686, 197 Pac. 201 (1921).
' UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 5; N. Y. PEGs. PROP. LAW (1909) § 166.
'Withers v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 67 Mo. App. 115 (1896) ; Rio Grande Cattle Co. v.
Burns, 82 Tex. 50, 17 S. W. 1043 (1891) ; II FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note I, § 5165.
' Baxter v. Boston-Pacific Oil Co., 81 Cal. App. 187, 253 Pac. 185 (1927).
"Will's Adm'r v. Weidemann Brewing Co., I71 Ky. 681, I88 S. W. 778 (1916) (bill in
equity).
"Bower v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 S. W. (2d) 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
3117 Fed. 6oi (C. C. A. 9th, 19o2), certiorari denied, 187 U. S. 641, 23 Sup. Ct. 841
(1902).
"Id. at 6o6. It cannot be said definitely whether this is mere dictum. It would seem
that the executrix would get the dividends on the stock of the testator whether or not she
received certificates in her own name.
" Del. Super. Ct., September 25, 1933. The official report of this case has not yet been
published. A recent case note upon it may be found in (933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 174.
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of trover being thus extended to protect the interest of a shareholder in a cer-
tificate free from evidence of any attaching collateral obligation.
A third interest which has been protected by an action for conversion is the
right of the owner of shares, upon proper demand, to be registered as such on the
corporate books where the duty is specifically created by by-law or where either
the by-laws Is or the share certificate itself 11 contains the common provision that
shares shall be transferable only upon the corporate books. And this is true,
though such a by-law provision is generally held to be for the benefit of the corpo-
ration and an otherwise valid transfer of the shares passes the interest in them as
between the assignor and the assignee.20 Since the corporation cannot in legal
contemplation deprive a shareholder of his shares by wrongfully registering an-
other as owner, one case at least has held that it could be no conversion to refuse
to make a transfer on the books.-" But the many courts permitting the action con-
sider that the setting up of an adverse claim of ownership may at least be regarded
by him as a conversion, even though the law will permit him, if he so elects,
to enforce his rights as owner. In Robinson Mining Co. v. Riepe,22 this rea-
soning was carried to its logical conclusion. In that case plaintiff tendered her
share certificates to the defendant corporation and demanded that it issue cer-
tificates in smaller denominations to her so as to facilitate disposal of them. The
corporation refused on the ground that it was the owner of the shares. In
allowing the plaintiff to recover, the court based its conclusion on the ground
that, although the right to "cut up" share certificates was not one which it would
protect by trover for the value of the shares,23 the reason alleged for the refusal
constituted the act a conversion without necessitating the vain gesture of a re-
quest to transfer.
Just what constitutes a proper demand for and an improper refusal to reg-
ister a transfer within the meaning of the rule discussed above has been the
source of much litigation. Where a purchaser of shares at an execution sale
does not get the certificates and the holder of the certificates denies that the
shares were owned by the judgment debtor at the time of the sale, the corpora-
tion is not called upon to decide the conflicting claims and to make a transfer
at the risk of being held liable for conversion. 2  The effect upon the duty to
transfer of a by-law giving the corporation a lien for the indebtedness of a
shareholder has often been before the courts. It has generally been held that
unless notice of such a lien is printed on the certificate or the transferee had
actual knowledge of such a by-law, a corporation cannot justify its refusal to
make a transfer by claiming a lien against the transferor.2 5 Under the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act there can be no lien or restriction on transfer unless indi-
'Herrick v. Humphrey, 73 Neb. 809, io3 N. W. 685 (19o5) ; cf. Dooley v. Gladiator
Co., 134 Iowa 468, 1O9 N. W. 864 (19o6).
Hilton v. Sylvania & G. R. R., 8 Ga. App. io, 68 S. E. 746 (191o).
0 Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend. 348 (N. Y. 1839) ; Comeau v. Guild Farm
Oil Co., 3 Daly 218 (N. Y. 1870) ; cf. Helm v. Swiggett, 12 Ind. 194 (1859). Contra:
Oxford Turnpike Co. v. Bunnel, 6 Conn. 552 (1827) ; Fisher v. Essex Bank, 71 Mass. 373
(1855). The Uniform Stock Transfer Act § i provides that delivery of the share certifi-
cate "indorsed either in blank or to a specified person" vests the ownership, notwithstanding
any provisions of this nature in the by-laws or articles of incorporation.
I Telford & F. Turnpike Co. v. Gerhab, 13 Atl. 9o (Pa. 1888).
--'4o Nev. 121, I61 Pac. 304 (1916).
'In Schell v. Alston Mfg. Co., 149 Fed. 439 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 19o6), apparently the only
other case in which the right to "cut up" certificates was in issue, it was held that, in the ab-
sence of a by-law, a shareholder was not entitled to have evidence of ownership of twenty-
five shares in twenty-five separate certificates.
"National Bank v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 21 Ohio St. 221 (1871); Harris v. Mid-
Continent Life Ins. CO., 75 Okla. io$, 182 Pac. 85 (iig).
, Case v. Bank, IOO U. S. 446 (1879) ; Booth v. Cincinnati Fin. Co., 1g Ohio App. 130
(923) ; Helm v. Swiggett, supra note 20, semnble.
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cated upon the certificate. 2' Even where a corporation is accorded a lien for
the shareholder's debts, it may not refuse to record a transfer to a pledgee, when
it had notice of the pledge before the pledgor's debt to it arose, and this although
the debt secured by the pledge was renewed after the latter debt arose.
2
1
While it has been held that, in the absence of fraud or intent to mislead,
refusal to issue certificates to the owner of shares on an invalid ground does
not estop the corporation to set up a valid ground,2 the view has also been taken
that it cannot set up a formal defect in the request for a transfer when it refused
on other grounds which are invalid.29  And it is a "conversion" for a corpora-
tion to refuse to record a transfer of shares to a pledgee upon the pledgor's
default, although the pledgee must prove and can recover only the amount of the
debt secured (the corporation having in the interim acquired the pledgor's inter-
est) - 0 It is no justification for a refusal to transfer that the indebtedness of
the pledgor is barred by the Statute of Limitations,2 1 nor that the certificates
upon which the action was brought were acquired by an illegal gambling con-
tract, where there was no evidence that the former owner had made any claim
upon the corporation for the shares.2 2 A corporation has been held liable for
conversion when it refused to transfer the interest of one of its organizers
to a purchaser for value, even though the charter had been burned and the offi-
cers believed that they were conducting the business as a partnership.
3
A New York case in 1931, however, apparently broke away from the fixed
current of authority, in holding a wrongful refusal to transfer to be no conver-
sion.34 The decision was based on the grounds that: (i) such a result would
be sanctioning a "presumption" that the corporation had deprived the owner of
his shares, which presumption would violate a "salutary statute" prohibiting a
corporation from purchasing its own stock except out of surplus, and (2) there
was an adequate remedy in damages in an "action for enforcing a transfer".
Arguments similar to the first of these have been held unavailing in other deci-
sions, 2 but the second shows a disinclination to permit trover where there is a
fully adequate remedy otherwise. It is undoubtedly wise to limit the action of
trover in some way, because the far greater fluctuations in the value of corpo-
rate shares than of that type of personal property to protect which the action
of trover was devised often makes the action far more punitive than remedial
in nature. It is encouraging to find that a court has recognized this factor to
some extent and has indicated a willingness to look to practical results in the
present condition of the law rather than to accept blindly precedents arising
under widely different conditions.
An extreme application of the remedy of trover is presented in United
States Cities Corp. v. Sautbine.8 Plaintiff was the owner of shares of stock,
the certificates of which provided that the shares were transferable only upon the
'UNIFORM STOCE TRANsFER AcT § 15.
' Bank of America v. McNeil, IO Bush 54 (Ky. 173).
=' Palmer v. O'Bannon Corp., 253 Mass. 8, 149 N. E. 112 (1925) (failure to fill in neces-
sary blanks).
= Booth v. Cincinnati Fin. Co., supra note 25 (no government stamps).
o Second Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 8 N. D. 50, 76 N. W. 504 (1898). Although
the court calls this an action for conversion, it applies rules inconsistent with this. If treated
as a conversion, plaintiff should have to prove only the value of the shares and it would be
incumbent upon the defendant to prove the amount of his interest.
2 Miller v. Houston City St. Ry., 55 Fed. 366 (C. C. A. 5th, 1893).
Ibid.
' Rio Grande Cattle Co. v. Burns, supra note ii.
' Robertson v. Nicholes Co., 141 Misc. 66o, 253 N. Y. Supp. 76 (ig3i).
'Ralston v. Bank of California, supra note I; Condouris v. Imperial T. T. & C. Co.,
supra note 3 (apparently the same statute as in Robertson v. Nicholes Co., supra note 34).
W 126 Okla. 172, 259 Pac. 253 (1927), 54 A. L. R. 1152 (1928).
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books of the corporation and that after a certain date the owner was to have an
option of converting them into "Class A" shares. In accordance with this latter
provision, plaintiff made a proper demand that his shares be cancelled and that
he be registered as owner of Class A shares. The corporation refused, and it
was held that this constituted a conversion of the Class A shares, and that plain-
tiff was not limited to an action for breach of contract. The court treated the case
as one involving a wrongful refusal to register a transfer. But it either over-
looked the fact that the right to be registered as a holder of Class A shares is an
incident only of the ownership of those shares,' 7 or else it considered that the
attempt to exercise the option given to the owner of the old shares was sufficient
to constitute him an owner of the new shares without further act by the corpora-
tion. It is interesting to compare this case with Crosby v. Stratton,"3 where the
plaintiff, seeking recovery in trover, alleged that the defendant held shares which
the corporation had created in violation of his own pre-emptive right. The case
was disposed of on the ground that the shares were treasury shares, to which
there was no pre-emptive right, but the court said in dictum that there could be
no liability for conversion of the shares upon this defendant, even if there were
a pre-emptive right, plaintiff's remedy, "if any", being an action against the
corporation." The plaintiff in this case evidently proceeded upon the theory
which the court in the Sautbine case perhaps adopted, to wit, that the right to
acquire new shares was equivalent to having acquired them.
An action for conversion of shares has been employed in a variety of fac-
tual situations which do not fall within the classifications heretofore discussed.
The corporation is liable to the owner of shares for conversion if it wrongfully
transfers his shares to another.40 On the other hand, the corporation is liable
for the value of the shares to one who acquires in good faith and for value a
certificate issued as a result of such wrongful transfer if it will not recognize
him as a shareholder,41 although obviously these two liabilities are mutually
exclusive. The owner also has an action for conversion against one who wrong-
fully procures a transfer to be made upon the books,4 2 and it is no defense that
the certificates by which the corporation was induced to act were unindorsed by
the owner.43  But such an action cannot be maintained by one having only the
right to collect dividends on the shares, unless he joins as party plaintiff the
party in whom all the other incidents of ownership are vested.4 4 It as been fur-
ther held that a gratuitous bailee who delivers up possession of certificates of
stock to a third party without the bailor's consent or authority is guilty of con-
version.4r A pledgee is liable in trover if he makes an unauthorized sale of
the shares or rehypothecates them for a greater amount than the pledgor's debt.4'
' Cf. Lewis v. Bidwell Electric Co., W41 Ill. App. 33 (198o).
17 Colo. App. 212, 68 Pac. 130 (1902).
It has been held that the denial of the pre-emptive right to subscribe to a new issue of
shares gives rise to an action of assumpsit, the damages being the difference between the
market value and the value for which the shares were created. Gray v. Portland Bank, 3
Mass. 363 (8O7).
'o Strange v. H. & T. C. R. R., 53 Tex. 162 (188o). See also Rosler v. General Gas
Corp., 42 Misc. 596, 255 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1932).
"Bank v. Lanier, 78 U. S. 369 (1870) ; Mandelbaum v. North American Mining Co., 4
Mich. 465 (1857); In re Ottos Kopje Diamond Mines, Ltd., [1893] 1 Ch. 618.
" Green v. Cavalier, 29o Pac. 548 (Cal. App. 193o) ; Mahaney v. Walsh, 16 App. Div.
6oi, 44 N. Y. Supp. 969 (1897).
"Minchew v. West, 78 Colo. 254, 241 Pac. 541 (925).
"Onondaga T. & D. Co. v. Price, 87 N. Y. 542 (1882).
" Hubbell v. Blandy, 87 Mich. 209, 49 N. W. 502 (1891); Kahaley v. Haley, 15 Wash.
678, 47 Pac. 23 (1896) (in both cases the corporation had later transferred the shares to
another).
4" Feige v. Burt, II8 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928 (1898) ; Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88
AtI. 501 (1913) ; 12 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note I, § 5679.
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It has been held that it is a conversion where the pledgee sold the shares rep-
resented by the certificate pledged, even though he owned other shares in the
corporation at the time,47 but the decision has also been reached that this was
no conversion unless there was a demand and refusal upon satisfaction of the
debt secured.48  Although the pledgor is entitled to have the article pledged
remain intact, it is difficult to see why there should be a conversion until such
time as the pledgee no longer owns shares which he can tender back to the
pledgor upon satisfaction of the debt.
By what acts of share ownership subsequent to a conversion a plaintiff
will lose his right of action is a little discussed problem. In Anides Ins. Co. v.
Waters,49 it was held that the owner of shares could not maintain an action for
conversion for an unjustified refusal to make a transfer when she subsequently
had accepted dividends and had paid an assessment upon the shares. In dispos-
ing of the plaintiff's contention, the court stated:
"This course of conduct was clearly inconsistent and not such as to
authorize the construction now, that the plaintiff below intended to insist
on her legal rights by treating the refusal as a conversion of the stock. We
think . . . that she had that right, but . . . the subsequent, frequent
acts of ownership afford not only evidence of an intention not to insist on
a conversion, but also a legal basis for holding that she lost the right to
do so." "
In Gillies v. Robert E. Lee Mining Co.,"' however, it was held to be a ques-
tion for the jury whether participation in a directors' meeting after a demand
for a transfer on the books had been wrongfully refused would estop plaintiff
from recovering in an action for conversion.
From the welter of case material what conclusions may be drawn as to the
essential factual considerations which will move a court to allow an action for
conversion of shares? Is it true that "any act of dominion wrongfully exerted
over another's property, in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, may be
treated as a conversion; and this is just as true of shares of stock as it is of
other property"? 12 The cases bear out no such sweeping generalization. It
would appear, rather, that a denial of only those incidents of share ownership
which are representative of all the incidents will constitute a conversion. That
is, such rights as the right to possession of a share certificate and the right to a
transfer upon the corporate books have been thus protected not because of their
intrinsic importance, but because ordinarily an invasion of one of these rights
amounts to a denial that the plaintiff is a shareholder, i. e., one entitled to the
totality of incidents defined as shares. The theory was thus stated in an early
decision:
"It is true the injury alleged here is, in form, the refusal to issue scrip,
while there it was the refusal to permit a transfer on the books; but in both
cases the wrong complained of is the same-the denial of his right to the
owner of the stock-whether the original subscriber and holder, or a per-
son who stands in his shoes precisely, or a mere purchaser. This is a de-
'4 Parsons v. Martin, 77 Mass. iii (1858) ; Fay v. Gray, 124 Mass. 5oo (1878) ; Allen v.
Dubois, 117 Mich. 115, 75 N. W. 443 (1898).
'Atkins v. Gamble, 42 Cal. 86 (1871); cf. Nourse v. Prime, 4 Johns. Ch. 490 (N. Y.
1820); as to which see Allen v. Dykers, 3 Hill 593 (N. Y. 1842). See also Atkins v. Gar-
rett, 270 Fed. 939 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).
" 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 152 (1876).
01Id. at 153.
78 Mont. 402, 254 Pac. 422 (1927).
G2 2 CLAK AD MARSHALL, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1901) § 379 (by.
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nial amounting to a conversion of the stock, reducing his possession to a
mere nominal ownership, without the power of enjoyment of his property.
This is the gravamen of the suit; not the mere refusal to give a certificate
in a certain form, or the refusal to permit a formal authentication of a
sale of the stock. It is a refusal to recognize the owner as owner; the de-
nial of his property, which is a breach of duty for which an action lies." .
It is true that the Aronstein and the Veatch cases indicate that the right
to a certificate is so significant a right per se that the concession of all or many
of the other incidents composing share ownership will not relieve the defendant
of liability for conversion. Whether these decisions are attributable to a mis-
conception or misapplication of the theory underlying the action, or to a con-
scious though unexpressed desire to extend the remedy to protect the separate
incidents of share ownership, cannot be definitely answered. Arguments might
be urged that an action for conversion should lie whenever some separate im-
portant incident or incidents of share ownership are denied, particularly when
existing remedies give inadequate relief. It is of some significance at least,
however, that an extended search has revealed no case in which an action for
conversion has been even brought before an appellate court where the facts
were that the shareholder had been deprived of the right to vote, the right to
dividends,5 4 the pre-emptive right to newly created shares,;5 or any single right,
however important, except one which by its nature was representative of all.
What will be the result of such a case, if it should arise, is at best conjectural.
But it is clear that, whether intentionally or not, the path has been paved to-
ward extending an action for conversion to the protection of separate incidents
of share ownership.
A. J. L.
'Arnold v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Barb. 424, 427 (N. Y. 1857).
"In Onondaga T. & D. Co. v. Price, supra note 44, the action was not brought by the
owner of the shares who had been deprived of them by the wrongful act, but by the party
entitled only to collect dividends.
' It is to be noted that in Crosby v. Stratton, supra note 38, the action was for conver-
sion not of the shareholder's original shares to which the pre-emptive right, if any, was inci-
dent, but of the newly created shares.
